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ABSTRACT 
 As developing countries climb the ladder of economic and social development, 
providing electricity to their poorest citizens becomes a social imperative, but the 
distribution of electricity in poverty-stricken regions is frequently more complex than 
simply installing electrical towers. This thesis focuses on rural electrification in India; 
how politics interacts with technical and economic factors in the design and 
implementation of the government’s electrification schemes. It finds that entrenched 
political interests, developed during Britain’s colonial era and cultivated in the years 
since independence, have historically been more interested in rent-seeking and treating 
electricity as a political favor than in developing electrical infrastructure. India’s unique 
legacy of colonial, distributive, and bureaucratic politics have resulted in a 
patronage-oriented political economy that affects the relationship between citizens and 
would-be electrical providers and also has direct impacts on investment and development 
in the electricity sector. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN 
INDIA: AN OVERVIEW ......................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS ...........................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................1 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 
D. ARGUMENT AND THESIS ORGANIZATION ...................................5 
II. THE TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS OF RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ........................................................................7 
A. GRID SCHEME .........................................................................................8 
B. NON-GRID SCHEME.............................................................................12 
C. SOUTH AFRICA’S ELECTRIFICATION EXPERIENCE: A 
COMPARATIVE BASE LINE ...............................................................13 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................21 
III. THE DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS OF ELECTRIFICATION IN INDIA .....22 
A. COLONIALISM AND INDEPENDENCE............................................23 
B. POST-INDEPENDENCE DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS .....................28 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMS IN 
INDIA ........................................................................................................32 
1. Kutir Jyothi Program (KYP) ......................................................35 
2. Rural Electricity Supply Technology Mission and the 
Electricity Act ...............................................................................37 
3. Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) .......40 
4. Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY)...........43 
5. Conclusion ....................................................................................47 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS .........................................................49 
A. BARRIERS TO ELECTRIFICATION .................................................49 
B. KEY FINDINGS ......................................................................................51 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................55 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Village Electrification Rates in Indian States, 2005 ..................................11 
Figure 2. Circular Power Structure within Indian Bureaucracy ................................32 
Figure 3. GARV Dashboard, December 13, 2016 ....................................................45 
Figure 4. GARV Dashboard, December 13, 2016 (left) and April 24, 2017 
(right). ........................................................................................................46 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Percentage of South African Households with Electric Appliances, 
2003............................................................................................................17 
Table 2. Consumption of Electricity by Household Appliances, 2003. ...................18 
Table 3. Per Capita Income vs. Growth Rate. ..........................................................28 
Table 4. Rural Electrification Schemes ....................................................................35 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ANC African National Congress (South Africa)  
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India) 
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party (India) 
CEA Central Electricity Authority (India)  
CFL Compact fluorescent lightbulb 
DDUGJY Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana 
EA Electricity Act (India) 
EBSST Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff (South Africa) 
GoI Government of India 
GW Gigawatt 
IAP Indoor air pollution 
KJP Kutir Jyothi Program (India) 
kW Kilowatt 
kWh Kilowatt-hour 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
LED Light emitting diode 
LNG Liquid natural gas 
MDG Millennium Development Goals 
MoP Ministry of Power (India) 
MNP Minimum Needs Program (India) 
MW Megawatt 
NEF National Electrification Fund (South Africa) 
NEP National Electrification Programme (South Africa) 
NGO Non-government organization 
NER National Electricity Regulator (South Africa) 
OBC Other Backwards Classes (India) 
PBMR Pebble bed modular reactor 
PV Photovoltaic 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa) 
 xiv 
RE Renewable energy 
REC Rural Electrification Corporation, Limited (India) 
REST Rural Electricity Supply Technology (India) 
RGGVY Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (India) 
SEB State Electricity Board (India) 
SHS Solar home system 
SP Samajwadi Party (India) 
UP Uttar Pradesh 
W Watt 




I would like to express my love and gratitude to my wife and family for their 
encouragement and patience throughout this process. I am immensely grateful to my thesis 
advisors, Dr. Naazneen Barma and Dr. Rachel Sigman, for their support, feedback, and 
guidance for this thesis.  
 
 xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL 
ELECTRIFICATION IN INDIA: AN OVERVIEW 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS 
What explains the patterns of rural electrification in India? This thesis examines the 
politics of rural electrification in India, including an assessment of the extent to which 
corruption and colonial roots played a role, in order to provide the context surrounding the 
technological/engineering, political, and economic factors that determine how and where 
electrification is implemented. It finds that entrenched political interests, developed during 
Britain’s colonial era and cultivated in the years since independence, have historically been 
more interested in rent-seeking and treating electricity as a political favor than in 
developing electrical infrastructure. India’s unique legacy of colonial, distributive, and 
bureaucratic politics have resulted in a patronage-oriented political economy that affects 
the relationship between citizens and would-be electricity providers and also has direct 
impacts on investment and development in the electricity sector. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Accessible and stable electrical power sources are an important measure of growth 
and development of populations in the hinterlands of developing countries. Accordingly, 
major international institutions of development, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank, have prioritized electrification as major policy and program 
objectives. The World Bank’s report, Energy Services for the World’s Poor, disagrees with 
the World Energy Agency’s (WEA) assessment that approximately two billion people live 
without electricity may actually be underestimated. World Bank further posits that a true 
estimation may be impossible due to inconsistent definitions of “access to electricity” and 
the proliferation of non-grid, distributed power systems that are difficult to assess.1 
Electricity provides three sets of general benefits, as evidenced by the West’s 
experience with electrification in the 19th and early 20th centuries. First, electrical devices 
                                                 
1 World Bank, Energy Services for the World’s Poor, Report No. 20824 (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2000), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/443371468764055824/pdf/multi-page.pdf 
2 
can be more efficient and therefore cheaper to operate than their fossil fuel contemporaries. 
Diesel-fueled engines, whether for locomotion or irrigation pumps, may be replaced by 
electrical motors in some cases; the reduction in weight equates to an energy savings to 
accomplish the same amount of work. Second, electrical devices are an entirely new 
technology, permitting new means of communication, education, and health care thanks to 
radio, lighting, and modern refrigeration. Third, moreover, the energy savings can be 
applied to increase productivity; for the same given amount of energy, electricity makes 
possible a greater output over time. Irrigation, for example, can lead to higher crop yields. 
Education about the benefits of electricity is key, as electrical demand is a lagging indicator 
and electricity without demand is useless. Demand for electrical lighting is a signal for 
desiring better education. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Governments keen on establishing rural electrification are struck by two sides of 
the same coin: making electricity affordable while at the same time convincing government 
officials that it is in their best interest to pay for it. Affordability is usually at least partially 
solved through subsidies and other economic policies. Households are also better able to 
afford electricity as their incomes increase as an indirect result of electrification and 
economic development. Willingness to pay is partly driven by education and public 
awareness campaigns espousing the virtues of electricity, such as increased health from 
avoiding toxic smoke and gasses.2 The arguments must also compare the cost of electricity 
to the current power source. For example, despite the availability of kerosene for lighting 
and cooking, it is viewed as a luxury item compared to continuing to burn firewood or other 
biomass. Kerosene is used, although sparingly, because the perceived cost of purchasing it 
is more than the opportunity costs lost while gathering firewood or dung. 
Electricity as a public good comes with a set of politics and economics that generate 
subsidies for the poor and remote hamlets, but frequently fall under the sway of powerful 
elites. The interests of the politicians become an integral part of the schemes in which any 
                                                 
2 Emily Rains and Ronald J. Abraham, “Rethinking Barriers to Electrification: Does Government 
Collection Failure Stunt Public Service Provision?” Energy Policy 114 (March 2018): 288. 
3 
change to the system becomes nearly impossible. Policies become focused on ever more 
subsides which translate into increased power and wealth for the elites.3 Williams, et al., 
point out that acquiring capital for electrification projects is difficult due to the perceived 
risk; not only are projects subject to theft and vandalism, but political chicanery at all levels 
of government.4 In short, the prime mover shifts from the electrical needs of the customers 
to the political interests that drive subsidy policies. The subsidies become entrenched and 
resistant to change, not only artificially affecting the financials of the energy sector, but 
creating the patron-client dynamic that creates subsidies that fail to achieve their intended 
purpose. For example, per the IEA, global spending on subsidizing cooking fuel in 2010 
was USD409 billion, while only 8% of that reached the bottom fifth of the population.5 
Some studies, such as those conducted by the International Growth Centre, posit a 
purely technical argument, claiming that advances in non-grid systems are insufficient for 
effecting meaningful change in India’s rural electrification rates.6 However, this argument 
is incomplete given its lack of consideration for the impact of bureaucratic institutions and 
their interaction with consumers and political elites. Scholars at the World Bank take a 
more holistic view, acknowledging that regulation is a crucial component of the sector 
provided that private enterprise is an engaged stakeholder and the regulators are truly 
independent, free from political influence.7  
                                                 
3 Sunila Kale, “Current Reforms: The politics of policy change in India’s electricity sector,” Pacific 
Affairs, 77, no. 3 (2004): 468. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40022911. 
4 Nathaniel Williams and Paulina Jaramillo, “Enabling Private Sector Investment in Microgrid-based 
Rural Electrification in Developing Countries: A Review,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 52 
(December 2015): 1268. Doi: 10.1016/j.rser.2015.07.153. 
5 International Energy Agency, Joint Report by IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank on Fossil-fuel 
and other energy subsidies: An Update of the G20 Pittsburgh and Toronto Commitments, (IEA: 
Washington, D.C.), January 2011, https://www.oecd.org/env/49090716.pdf. 
6 Michael Aklin, Patrick Bayer, S.P. Harish, and Johannes Urpelainen, Rural electrification with off-
grid community microgrids. International Growth Centre. December 2015, 16. https://www.theigc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Aklin-et-al-2015-Final-report.pdf 
7 Achilles G. Adamantiades, John E. Besant-Jones, and Mangesh Hoskote, “Power Sector Reform in 
Developing Countries and the role of the World Bank,” (paper presented at the 16th Congress of the World 





Roughly 75% of India’s population is still rural and remote. Traditional fuels 
continue to be used, as families are either unwilling or unable to pay for electricity, which 
is viewed as a luxury item. Most households rely on biomass (firewood, crop waste) while 
others use kerosene. Kerosene in particular is an important backup fuel source for lighting 
and cooking. Even urban consumers, who mostly consume electricity, supplement their 
power with wood, gas, and kerosene. The International Energy Agency (IEA) assesses that 
nearly every village in India has access to electricity yet actual household connection rates 
languish at around 60%.8 
Low connection rates are common for the poorest citizens, as inability to pay, 
shoddy construction, and unreliable services frequently lead to the decision to forego 
adoption of modern electricity and continue to use time-tested sources. As might be 
expected, demand for electricity is inversely related to its price; the market prices of 
biomass and petroleum are inextricably linked to that of electricity when considering 
consumption. Reliability appears to be a significant factor as well. The World Bank has 
noted that increasing the availability by one hour increases household connection rate by 
2.7% and consumption by 14.4%.9 This reinforces the notion that access alone is 
insufficient; service reliability must be factored in order to see meaningful gains.  
Regardless of the social imperatives placed on rural electrification, establishing the 
infrastructure to generate, transmit, and consume electricity are not immune from economic 
concerns. The cost of electricity is compared with current substitutes, e.g., kerosene and 
biomass. Electrification schemes and subsidies are discussed not only in terms of benefits 
to the poor but also benefits to administrators and politicians. This thesis will include a 
brief discussion on the future of rural electrification programs and how best to proceed, 
particularly given recent advancements in renewable energy technologies. 
                                                 
8 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, (Paris: IEA, 2010), 538. 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo2009.pdf. 
9 World Bank, The Welfare Impact of Rural Electrification: A Reassessment of the Costs and Benefits: 
An IEG Impact Evaluation, (World Bank: Washington, D.C.), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTRURELECT/Resources/full_doc.pdf. 
5 
Electrification has non-trivial effects on populations ranging from improved health 
to economic growth. Numerous barriers exist to deployment, including socioeconomic 
concerns (e.g., caste and cost) and engineering factors (e.g., single-home solar photovoltaic 
versus local diesel grid). An examination of patterns of rural electrification use in India can 
provide insights with respect to the underlying causal drivers of policy choices made, 
especially the extent to which political and historical factors undermine the most 
technically and economically efficient policies. Electrification is important both in and of 
itself and as a contributing factor to improved economic development.  
D. ARGUMENT AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The rate of rural electrification throughout India has been lackluster in comparison 
to the experience of other developing nations and this thesis provides an analysis of the 
historical and current socio-political contexts in which various reforms have been enacted. 
It is argued here that while numerous political campaigns have been launched under the 
guise of public benefits, the outcomes are almost universally constrained by the same 
institutions. Officials are tasked with the responsibility of not only providing services but 
also developing the regulations that bind them. This circular relationship of ownership, 
distributor, and regulator lead to a culture of corruption and rent seeking that ultimately 
fails to deliver on the initial promise. Under this construct, existing relationships cannot be 
relied upon in future reform schemes. It would be foolhardy, however, to hold accountable 
any one institution in such complex systems. This thesis shows that not only entrenched 
interests but also institutional and technological path dependencies, socio-economic status, 
and career opportunism define India’s rural electrification outcomes. Scholars such as Drs. 
Sunila Kale and Brian Min argue that while political ideology and external pressures 
contribute to India’s electrification outcomes, it is in the relationship between citizens and 
the state institutions that form the largest barrier and it is this perspective that is the most 
convincing.10  
                                                 
10 Kale, “Current Reforms: The politics of policy change in India’s electricity sector.” 
6 
This thesis examines three major contributors that explain the lackluster outcomes 
from India’s attempts at rural electrification: the engineering and other technical challenges 
inherent in the development and deployment of non-grid electrical systems, entrenched 
rent-seeking and legacy patronage politics from India’s colonial period, and economic 
factors that drive investor support, or lack thereof. This thesis argues that the confluence 
of geography, technology, and bureaucratic barriers contribute to the sub-optimal outcomes 
of India’s rural electrification schemes.  
The research for this thesis is necessarily descriptive; official publications, 
websites, and institutional releases are examined, as are the results of external studies by 
international bodies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Board. Case studies 
conducted by government and independent organizations are examined for causal 
relationships and correlation. The methods used here establish the foundation for 
examining how institutional actors and interests initiated each reform scheme as well as 
suggest areas for further research with respect to rural electrification outcomes. Results and 
published works of specialists such as Dr. Kale and Dr. Min are also incorporated. 
Chapter II provides an overview of India’s current grid system and examines the 
differences between grid and non-grid electrical systems. A case study analysis of South 
Africa’s rural electrification experience is presented in order to highlight the technical 
issues involved as well as some socio-political parallels and, ultimately, compare the 
outcomes of the two countries’ programs. Chapter III examines India’s legacy of 
distributive politics and its relationship to India’s colonial history. The historical analysis 
then informs an overview of the evolution of India’s rural electrification programs starting 
in the late 20th century. This combination of technology and political economy develops 
the conclusion in the final chapter that technology, institutions, and regulatory space are 
inseparable determinants of effective rural electrification. 
7 
II. THE TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS OF RURAL 
ELECTRIFICATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
India suffered from a relatively anemic economic growth rate since its 
independence in 1947, largely due to the preference for socialism on the part of its 
nationalist leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first 
prime minister. The global economic downturn in 1991 provided the impetus for market-
oriented reforms, leading to an average growth rate of 5.4% per year.11 The reforms 
marked a departure from central planning, especially through deregulation and tax reform. 
One effect of the reforms and subsequent uptick in economic growth was growth of the 
middle- and upper-class populations that, among other things, drove an increase in demand 
for electrical power as citizens acquired electrical appliances. 
While economics drove the demand for electricity, expanding availability to both 
urban and rural customers has proven most challenging from an engineering perspective. 
The competing interests and providers, such as those found in the state electricity boards 
(SEB), have resulted in a mismatched system of grid and non-grid supplies based on the 
favored contractor. This mismatch leads to gross inefficiencies, line loss, theft, and 
vandalism that contribute to an ill-served customer base. 
This chapter examines the engineering challenges in deploying a robust electrical 
generation, transmission, and distribution system. In order to better understand India’s 
particular challenges, South Africa is used as a comparative case study given their similar 
colonial histories. Colonialism does not affect modern electrification per se, but the 
attitudes and culture developed throughout the colonial period has formed the institutional 
culture and regulatory space that exists today, at least partly explaining how engineering 
decisions are made at the government level. An examination of the technical aspects 
illustrates why certain solutions, such as solar-home systems (SHS), can be more beneficial 
to both the customer and the provider than, for example, a grid connection. 
                                                 
11 World Bank, India Development Update, (New Delhi, India: World Bank, March 2018), 13. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29515. 
8 
A. GRID SCHEME 
Most Westerners are familiar with the standard grid electrical system in which 
power is distributed from a generating station to homes through a series of substations. 
Topography restricts extension of the grid into the hinterlands; beyond a certain point the 
cost becomes untenable. Engineers have developed numerous schemes to overcome the 
obstacles of grid service, ranging from so-called mini-grid systems that can electrify a 
small village to self-contained solar home systems, or SHS, or photovoltaic (PV) system 
for individual homes. Sizes of power plants can vary wildly, from under 5 kW to over 300 
MW. Since India is blessed with abundant sunshine, some estimate that 0.1% of land could 
deliver up to 146 GW of PV-based electricity.12 
Grid systems, perhaps unsurprisingly, spread from dense urban centers to rural 
areas. Grid electrification, then, cannot easily be separated into “rural” versus “urban” 
electrification as investments in the grid are inherently investments in projected rural 
projects. One of the effects of electrification has been a commensurate rise in prosperity, 
usually measured in terms of productivity and household incomes. It also follows that 
higher per capita incomes will consume increasing amounts of electricity as they are better 
able to afford more efficient appliances.  
As urban centers become electrified, eyes turn toward the hinterlands. Politically, 
rural electrification is a symbol of progress and, despite the physical difficulties and 
financial non-viability, remains a high governmental priority. The challenges in 
maintaining a mini-grid, or even a SHS, are legion. Theft is a universal problem; thieves 
and vandals will harvest infrastructure (e.g., transformers) for the raw materials.13 Methods 
of stealing electricity are limited only by the imagination and knowledge of basic 
electronics of the thieves. Extra taps are frequently added to load centers while some people 
are capable of manipulating meters. Those who can afford it can even purchase a tank 
                                                 
12 Sanjeev H. Kulkarni and T. R. Anil, “Rural Electrification through Renewable Energy Sources—
An Overview of Challenges and Prospects,” International Journal of Engineering Research, 3 (2013): 386. 
13 Debajit Palit and K. Sarangi, Renewable Energy-Based Rural Electrification: The Mini-Grid 
Experience From India (New Delhi: Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development, 2014). 
9 
circuit: a means of wirelessly absorbing electricity through the magnetic fields around 
transmission wires.14  
The costs of generation in a grid system are affected by economies of scale. The 
load factor—the ratio of average to peak consumption for the system—directly affect the 
cost of operation. If, for example, the load factor is high, then the cost for a central power 
plant is lower as the cost is spread over more consumers. This means that a high load factor 
for a smaller, non-grid system will suffer from high fuel and operating costs. Urban centers 
are better able to mitigate these costs, as residential customers typically have heavy demand 
in the morning and evening with industrial users supplying the demand throughout the day. 
Distance also plays a role, as establishing power lines to remote areas is a high one-time 
cost, but line losses—loss of available power due to the electrical resistance of the power 
lines—also increase over distance. 
India, as the fourth largest consumer of electricity in the world after the United 
States, China, and Russia, still suffers from a demand/generation mismatch.15 At least 25% 
of the population lacks access to electricity and those that do suffer from rolling electricity 
blackouts.16 The percentage of electrification is further divided when considering urban 
centers vice rural households; 94% of city homes have electricity compared to 60% of rural 
households.17  
                                                 
14 Power lines generate magnetic fields while electricity is flowing through them. A tank circuit 
placed within the magnetic field works in reverse, absorbing the magnetic field and converting it to 
electrical current. Modern power companies have sophisticated systems to detect such theft but less-
complex—and many non-grid—systems do not. 
15 “India’s Economic Growth is Driving its Energy Consumption,” U. S. Energy Information 
Administration, April 1, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10611. 
16 Todd Lindeman, “1.3 Billion are Living in the Dark,” Washington Post, November 6, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/world-without-power. 
17 Sun-Joo Ahn and Dagmar Graczyk, “Understanding Energy Challenges in India—Policies Players 
and Issues,” (Paris: IEA, 2012): 24. https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
India_study_FINAL_WEB.pdf. 
10 
India’s power grid is one of the most inefficient in the world, with up to 50% 
transmission losses.18 It is also one of the most unequal across the country, as shown in 
Figure 1, with powerful elites and politicians negotiating electricity in exchange for 
political gain. The existence and development of the grid is, perhaps not unreasonably, 
conflated with the actual distribution of electricity. As an example, Uttar Pradesh, despite 
being the most populous, is also the poorest with several institutional barriers to 
electrification.19 The demand exceeds the energy supply, which causes rolling blackouts 
within the province, leading to a political process in which the citizens vote for the 
candidate who promises to deliver more basic services. Electrification, as a policy goal, 
has been achieved by virtue of building the infrastructure for power delivery (e.g., 
transformers and power lines) but the pernicious assumption is that power is supplied on 
demand. While some areas suffer daily blackouts, elected officials routinely meddle in 
energy affairs, declaring their client areas immune from the daily cuts.20 
                                                 
18 Namrata Kohli, “The Loss of Power,” Economic Times, October 2, 2014. 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new-sections/energy/the-loss-of-power/lifenologyshow/
44083310.cms. 
19 Brian Min, Power and the Vote, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 127. 
20 Min, Power and the Vote, 131. 
11 
  
Figure 1. Village Electrification Rates in Indian States, 200521 
Electrical power has thus far enjoyed both a strong public-sector presence (e.g., 
state-run power companies) and excessive subsidies.22 The subsidies tend to discourage 
private investment, particularly when combined with the fact that not only do the state 
agencies micro-manage infrastructure and distribution, but India’s federalist system of 
government requires close coordination between central and state governments. The central 
government creates policy and frequently provides funding, but it is up to the states to 
actually implement the schemes. Poor growth is usually a self-fulfilling prophecy; lack of 
public investment in infrastructure discourages private investment with the associated 
failure in growth rates.23 
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B. NON-GRID SCHEME 
The costs in establishing a non-grid distribution system are non-trivial but 
considerably less than extending the grid to remote hamlets. India provides relief to rural 
customers by subsidizing the costs. There are currently four projects running in parallel, 
two private ventures and two public utilities. All provide enough electricity to provide a 
home with basic lighting, cooking heat, and possibly a fan outlet or cell phone charger at a 
subsidized cost of $0.50 per week to $2.50 per month.24 In order to combat theft, 
proprietary connectors and smart meters are used. 
Companies have discovered another means of eliminating local theft and 
corruption: training villagers to perform basic maintenance.25 Distributing maintenance in 
addition to electricity has proven quite efficient; each village appoints a technician who 
reports to a regional master technician. The village also assigns bill collection to a different 
person; separating maintenance from accounts receivable further reduces potential graft 
and conflicts of interest. This model of distributing ownership encourages village 
investment and inhibits vandalism and theft, either of raw materials or power. 
One challenge of managing power systems is essential maintenance. No system is 
ever truly self-sufficient and all require at least some form of periodic upkeep. Grid systems 
are staffed with full-time engineers and technicians; the wide dispersal of non-grid systems 
make that unfeasible, especially considering the cost and difficulty of transporting 
technicians to remote villages. Some private companies have solved the problem by 
training local residents; there is limited evidence that theft and vandalism is curbed by 
investing residents with a sense of ownership in the infrastructure. 
This leads to a redefining of the quality of electricity. Not only is clean power, i.e., 
frequency- and voltage-stable, important, but more important is the duration that power is 
available.26 It is common for a village to have only a few hours of stable electricity per 
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day, or even none at all.27 Under the current Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana 
(RGGVY) scheme, states are required to provide at least 6–8 hours of electricity per day 
to the electrified villages.28 
C. SOUTH AFRICA’S ELECTRIFICATION EXPERIENCE: A 
COMPARATIVE BASE LINE 
South Africa provides a helpful comparative case study against India due to their 
shared colonial histories and their divergence from autarkic policies. South Africa’s 
geography differs greatly from India’s with a lack of impassible mountain ranges coupled 
with political borders. However, the compositions of their populations in terms of the 
urban–rural divide are similar enough to warrant a comparison. While India has developed 
into an open-market economy with roughly 7% annual growth and $1,500 per capita GDP, 
South Africa’s growth is a mere 1.6% but just over $5,000 in per capita GDP.29 Part of 
this disparity can be explained by South Africa’s aggressive electrification deployment in 
the years since 1994 when apartheid was abolished. This section examines South Africa’s 
electrification experience in order to evaluate the technical and engineering aspects of 
power generation and distribution as well as the political considerations and dedication to 
infrastructure development. 
Electrification of the hinterlands is an essential component of a state’s transition 
from developing to developed. Modern states tend to follow a path in which the state makes 
significant investments in infrastructure in order to provide the best possible environment 
for its citizens’ development. Put simply, investments in the welfare of the workers tends 
to yield higher productivity. South Africa’s efforts to modernize its population not only 
includes maximizing the number of households with ready access to electricity but also 
increasing deployment of renewable sources. 
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For South Africa to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set at 
Johannesburg in 2002, substantial increases in electricity production and distribution must 
be made. The rural poor as a population are increasingly at risk of high illiteracy, poor 
fertility rate, and the twin evils of low life expectancy and high infant mortality.30 South 
Africa, with its population of 45 million, is endowed with natural resources, including the 
coal and radionuclides necessary for energy production. Coal is the cornerstone of their 
energy and economy, supplying 91% of their electrical generation and 75% of their non-
renewable demand, with nuclear power largely supplying the remainder.31 
The institutions and policies of the National Party’s apartheid regime were the 
primary barriers for electrification until the transition to democratic governance. Since the 
rural (read: mostly black) population was at best distrustful of the government in 
Johannesburg and unconvinced that the promises of the new government would come to 
fruition, the electrification project was directed by the national government without input 
from local communities.32 As such, financing came the South African Government in 
cooperation with the primary energy company, Eskom. The initial phase of expansion from 
1994 to 2000 was an explosion of development, with a doubling of electrified households, 
going from 35% to 71% and ultimately 84% in 2011, providing electricity to over 5.2 
million households.33 
The apartheid regime determined the direction of developmental progress and 
heavily influenced the energy industry, with the effect that electricity was provided to 
industry and white households, accounting for about 12% of the population. The ANC 
party that replaced the National Party in 1994 promised greater distribution with the 
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“Access to electricity for all” campaign.34 Unfortunately, this noble message was widely 
assumed to mean grid electricity. Key problems in generating greater electrical distribution 
include coal-based power is accompanied by non-trivial pollution, with long-term effects 
on respiratory health; electrification expansion programs constrained by access to funding; 
and severe inefficiencies in the distribution sector. More than 120 areas have less than 
1,000 customers, resulting in low transmission efficiency, higher costs, and questionable 
fiscal viability of the utility companies; non-payment and electricity theft contribute to 
financial instability. 
In order to combat this, three regulations were passed. The ANC established the 
National Electrification Programme (NEP), the National Electricity Regulator (NER), and 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The NEP, a government-funded 
initiative, had a singular goal of raising the percentage of electrified households to 66% by 
2001, divided into 80% of urban areas supplied and 46% of rural regions.35 The NER’s 
mandate is to regulate the supply industry via licensing of generators, transmitters, and 
distributors throughout South Africa.36 The RDP, meanwhile, established a national 
electrification target of 2.5 million households by the end of the 20th century.37 South 
Africa’s largest generator, Eskom, shared the government’s goals and set an annual goal 
of 300,000 new households with an ultimate goal of supplying electricity to 1.75 million 
households.38  
As with most government programs, funding was the limiting factor. Eskom largely 
funded the first phase when, in 2000, the National Electrification Fund (NEF) assumed 
responsibility. The NEF was financed largely through the public sale of government-owned 
industry assets as well as grants and tariffs. As the South African government decided that 
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electrification would be the fulfillment of socio-economic responsibility vice a commercial 
venture, Johannesburg passed the Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff (EBSST) in 
order to provide electricity, free of charge for up to 50 kWh per month, to the country’s 
most destitute citizens.39 
At the end of the National Party’s reign, a mere 36% of the population had access 
to electricity.40 By 2001, the NEP exceeded their original target by 1.35 million 
households, providing electrical access to more than 3.4 million since the NEP’s inception 
in 1994.41 A non-grid initiative was established to counter expected shortfalls in 1999. 
Initially, 350,000 solar home systems (SHS) was intended for installation in seven districts, 
but this was cut to six due to budget shortfalls. The SHS is designed to provide inexpensive, 
local electricity; the government subsidizes each unit at ZAR 3500 (USD 253) to the utility 
for each installed unit while the user pays a flat monthly fee of ZAR 58 (USD 4) for 
maintenance.42 The system provides only 50Wp, but it is enough to power four lights, a 
radio, and a black and white television.43 Table 1 illustrates the percentage of appliance 
ownership with respect to per capita income levels. The extremely poor have their service 
fee reduced to ZAR 18 (USD 1.26) via subsidy. These subsidies were provided through 
National Electrification Fund (NEF), a government-established fund with revenue supplied 
by the government, energy industry, and international grants, both public and private. To 
prevent, or at least reduce, opportunities for graft and corruption, annual progress reports 
on the NEP are published by the NER. 
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Table 1. Percentage of South African Households with Electric 
Appliances, 200344 
 % of all 
households % of households with per capita monthly income of: 
  <ZAR 130 ZAR 130–270 >ZAR 270 
Hotplate 37 10 27 53 
Kettle 32 12 25 65 
Refrigerator 43 12 28 65 
Television 47 19 33 67 
Radio 87 79 85 91 
 
The EBSST, enacted in 2002, has not only subsidized basic electricity needs but also 
enabled the development of non-grid electricity. Taking the form of solar home systems 
(SHS), the non-grid program was intended to target those destitute homes that were too far 
from the grid to make connections practical. For a nominal (and highly subsidized) fee, 
households were provided with a solar energy system and paid a monthly fee for routine 
maintenance. However, the SHS deployment has met with criticism as not only do SHS 
require higher operating costs, but the maintenance requires specialized training that is in short 
supply. Theft, vandalism, and lack of roads have also been noted.45 Proponents have pointed 
out that, among other benefits, access to electricity has improved the health of the poor by 
replacing the burning of fuel indoors along with efficient electric cooking.46 Advocates also 
argue that costs are irrelevant as electrification is a social responsibility and long-term 
investment. 
Despite the progress by the turn of the century, Johannesburg expanded their 
ambitions, announcing a new goal of providing free basic water and electricity to the most 
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destitute of its citizens.47 The initial power rating was set at 50kWh per month for two 
reasons: first, slightly more than half of the currently connected households consumed less 
than 50 kWh per month on average and second, it was calculated that 50kWh per month was 
sufficient to provide lighting, cooking, and radio or television.48 Meeting these basic needs, 
and thereby relieving the burden on the poorest of their people, was viewed as a moral 
necessity. Success can be measured by comparing the energy consumption of average 
household appliances to the ownership rate of the same. 
The EBSST was intended to provide 50 kWh per month but that allows no overhead 
for appliances beyond what was calculated. Table 2 provides a matrix of appliance wattage 
and calculated monthly totals. Using, for example, a hotplate would push residents past the 
50 kWh per month limit. There are other options and homes are not limited to exclusively 
electrical appliances. Encouraging the use of compact fluorescent (CFL) or LED lightbulbs, 
for example, would reduce the electrical load by 21–26 kWh each month. (CFL: 15W, LED: 
1.5W) Shifting to a LNG stove would further reduce the demand, though it is uncertain 
whether LNG fuel, including transportation, is cheaper than electricity. 
Table 2. Consumption of Electricity by Household Appliances, 
2003.49 
Appliance Units Consumption 
(W) 
Hours used/day Units/Month 
(kWh) 
Light bulbs 3 60 5 28 
Television 1 50 6 9 
Radio 1 6 4 1 
Hotplate 1 1000 1 31 
Kettle 1 1000 0.25 8 
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The success of non-grid solutions has not met with the same levels of success. The 
SHS photovoltaic modules have previously met with high failure rates, fundamental 
technological issues, and other concerns, most notably theft for harvesting the semiconductor 
material and copper. Modern designs have greatly improved in the intervening years and are 
worth revisiting. However, SHS are designed primarily to provide sufficient power for 
lighting, while studies show that the highest priority for the poor is power for cooking and 
water heating.50  
Rural electrification is heavily subsidized through the National Electrification Fund. 
The subsidies are largely funded through the EBSST and allocates up to 50 kWh per month 
for destitute homes. Approximately 20 kWh provides power for cooking while the remainder 
equates to the energy required for three lights for four hours per day and one radio for 16 
hours per day.51 Emphasis has been placed on renewable energy, as in the SHS, but also with 
geothermal and wind, particularly in remote or isolated areas. Terrain and topography further 
complicate deployment, as the lack of roads and other infrastructure only increases the cost 
of installation and maintenance. The government accepts these transaction costs as part of 
meeting its socioeconomic obligations; in many cases it is impossible to recover operating 
costs to supply a rural customer.52 
Eskom and the government recognize the value of renewable energy in rural areas. 
The modular nature of SHS and other renewables make them particularly well suited for 
isolated locations; systems, and therefore investment and capital, can be easily planned. The 
diversity within the non-grid system also bolsters energy security via immunity to petroleum 
price shocks. Biofuel (e.g., bagasse) is also renewable in addition to wind and hydro projects. 
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South Africa made significant strides in nuclear power during the 2000’s, particularly 
with respect to pebble bed technology. The pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR), rated at 
100MW, was approved by the government for export with China, Japan, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom as potential customers, but was ultimately mothballed in 2010 due 
to lack of investment. The government was careful to note that the technology is sound and 
the decision was purely financial.53 
With the high level of electrification within the country, efforts are underway to 
improve the efficiency of the generation and distribution chains. Self-contained multi-socket 
outlets known as ready boards have proven suitable for use in any type of home (including 
mud huts and cinderblock homes) and provide savings of 75% when compared to internal 
wiring.54 Ready boards combined with prepaid metering schemes are now used extensively 
in the country. Other engineering techniques, such as transformer distance and load limiters, 
further improve efficiency by decentralizing the system and therefore eliminating costs-of-
scale. 
While electrification has spread beyond South Africa, leading to the power-sharing 
scheme within the South African Power Pool, the combination of South Africa’s political 
history combined with an established, modern industry and decisive political will makes 
replication in other countries somewhat limited. Political institutions, technological 
modernization, and social benefits of electrification can be exported into other developing 
countries. Connection to grid power is the most common means of electrification, but it is also 
the most expensive. Geography frequently makes decentralized, or non-grid, power more 
attractive, as it eliminates the need for transmission lines and other infrastructure. 
Electrification of remote areas continues but at a much slower pace, as the easiest and cheapest 
areas to energize have already been serviced. Efforts to reach the truly isolated areas, while 
expensive, have not been abandoned by the government in their goal to completely power the 
country. 
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As more homes have access to electricity, response to the EBSST has been 
overwhelmingly positive. Specific benefits have been noted: ability to cook more efficiently; 
lighting provides opportunity to study textbooks or read newspapers; reduced indoor air 
pollution thanks to fuel substitution; expand lighting to other, previously unlit, rooms; and 
greater media and news access (longer use of television and/or radio).55  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the engineering and economic challenges inherent in rural 
electrification schemes and considered grid vice non-grid solutions for a given geography. 
Geographical conditions are important determinants of electrification solutions; remote 
populations may simply be physically distant from urban centers, relatively easily serviced by 
a grid system. Other villages may be geographically isolated by impassible terrain and better 
served by a microgrid or local generating station since extending grid services would be 
prohibitively expensive. South Africa’s research into alternative generation schemes was 
based on the appropriate solution for a given community; while there is some amount of 
preference in any government endeavor, the post-apartheid culture was powerful enough to 
ensure the proper technological remedy without untoward political influence. India continues 
to struggle with expectations of favored constituencies and encourages pursuing the solutions 
developed by political clients rather than what may be in the best interest of the communities.  
South Africa’s electrification experience was examined in depth as a case study to 
compare against India’s ongoing schemes. The abandonment of apartheid was the catalyst by 
which major institutional and structural reforms were possible and the expansion of electrical 
power enabled rural citizens to enter into the modern labor force. Johannesburg desired a 
complete and utter break from the culture of apartheid, thus clearing the way for more 
progressive policies, attitudes, and institutions that govern the production and delivery of 
electricity and other public goods. The next chapter delves into India’s institutions and 
infrastructure in order to determine the relationship between socio-political structures and 
infrastructure development.  
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III. THE DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS OF ELECTRIFICATION IN 
INDIA 
Economics are not immune to the vagaries of political relationships. India’s history, 
particularly those under colonialism, greatly color the current state of institutional 
behavior. Acemoglu and Robinson explored this colonial legacy and found that British 
colonizers erected so-called “extractive institutions” that consisted of the dichotomy of the 
control of the local population as well as extracting rents from them.56 This chapter briefly 
explores colonial and pre-colonial history as a lens through which post-independence class 
warfare and the eventual politics of public goods can be analyzed. This discussion then 
leads into an evaluation of the evolution of the rural electrification programs embarked 
upon by the Indian government culminating in the current scheme. India’s colonial 
experience greatly influenced their institutional development after independence and, 
despite efforts at reform, continue to be felt today. Electrification in particular was viewed 
with skepticism by some of India’s early leaders. Analysis of India’s rural electrification 
projects in this context builds to the argument that India’s initial centralized planning 
system contributed to a culture of corruption and patronage that delayed rural 
electrification and currently affects the distribution of power throughout the country. 
A. COLONIALISM AND INDEPENDENCE 
India, as a country, had been composed largely of six warring kingdoms until the 
introduction of the British East India Company. Britain chose from three different 
governing methods for each province: landlord, or zamindari, individual cultivator, 
raiyatwari, or village-based, mahalwari, with the goal of maximizing revenue to the crown 
while maintaining stability in the colony.57 Language presented a barrier, however, when 
attempting to make an informed decision. When the British chose to establish a landlord in 
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Bengal, for example, they did so largely because they found landlords already established. 
What was not apparent was that these “landlords” were merely tribal chiefs and not the 
industrial-scale agriculturalists that Britain assumed.58 
The differences in governance between the zamindari and raiyatwari areas were 
not insignificant. The peasants in zamindari areas were largely under the control of the 
landlords who were empowered to extract taxes with impunity. When contrasted with the 
contractual relationships found in raiyatwari and mahalwari areas, investments in 
development foundered in zamindari areas, likely due to a fear that any returns would be 
expropriated by the landlord.59 
Banerjee and Iyer further discuss, like other scholars, that resentment of the 
landlords by the peasants resulted in a post-independence political environment that sought 
to reverse the direction of extraction. Political mobilization of the residents led to a form 
of class warfare that focused on resource extraction from the wealthy rather than the 
development of public goods, e.g., electricity.60  A form of political inertia was formed 
whereby the elites were forced to address or resist the activism rather than invest in 
development, although their history of self-enrichment renders the idea that they would 
focus instead on development charitable at best. The non-landlord areas, by contrast, 
enjoyed investment in public goods by the colonists; while gains could be extracted, they 
were governed by contract and law rather than caprice. This is shown by the fact that non-
landlord areas possessed arguably better public goods and a much better political 
environment than in zamindari areas.61 
India’s colonial experience was unique in that the states were governed differently; 
some districts were governed by a landlord while others let the villages or even, in some 
cases, individual cultivators manage their own affairs.62 Despite the intention of the British 
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to maximize the Crown’s revenue while maintaining colonial stability, inequality became 
rampant among the landlord districts. This set the tone for post-colonial elections where 
class warfare ensued, with wealth redistribution and rent collection prioritized while 
leaving public goods and infrastructure to languish.63  
This class warfare gave rise to widespread corruption best characterized by 
Easterly’s “centralized” corruption and, ultimately, the style of patrimonialism practiced 
in India today.64 Easterly also identified “opportunities for graft” as the primary motivation 
for perpetuating bad policies and prescribed quality institutions and anti-corruption policies 
as methods for minimizing the damage.65 Inequality swiftly became rampant among the 
landlord districts, extending into the mid-20th century. Uttar Pradesh, the most populous 
province of India, had a mix of landlord districts (25%) and non-landlord (75%). The 
landlords, as the sole authority for revenue collection and distribution, controlled a large 
proportion of revenue and a correspondingly high measure of inequality.66  
Contemporary politics in India is an extension of the country’s colonial experience 
and a complicated affair, heavily driven by caste, language, religion, and class. Three 
political parties currently form the power base in contemporary UP: the Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) mobilizes lower-caste voters, while the middle- and upper-class largely 
support the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu-nationalist party.67 The Samajwadi 
Party (SP) is made up of the large number of Muslim and Other Backward Class (OBC) 
members.68 The rise of the BSP and its emphasis on policies that favor lower-income 
residents has improved rural electrification within UP, but the fact that India has separated 
construction of electrical infrastructure from actual power distribution indicates that 
electricity is controlled by political actors rather than a static public good. As Brian Min 
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states, “it is often said that Indian politics centers around bijli, sadak, paani (electricity, 
roads, water).”69 These social divisions reflect the amount of public goods that are able to 
be extracted; BJP-dominated areas historically tend to have better access to public goods 
while OBC districts typically languish.70 Banerjee and Somanathan contend that this is 
largely due to a relationship between land ownership and political power. Since the elites 
in the BJP derive a large part of their wealth through property, they have an outsized impact 
on the production and delivery of public goods.71 
Electrification after independence was a contentious subject; Gandhi was skeptical 
and feared that electricity would obviate traditional lifestyles and livelihoods.72 The Nehru 
administration, however, disagreed and considered electrification as an essential 
prerequisite for industrialization and modernity.73 Pre-independence leaders favored the 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy that was in vogue due to it supposed 
ability to rapidly industrialize countries. Like Gandhi, Nehru was unconvinced that the 
economy could be entrusted to private enterprise and so promoted an environment in which 
heavy industry would spur economic development for the benefit of all.74 Passed shortly 
after independence, the Electricity Act of 1948 provided that all power generation would 
be controlled by the state. State Electricity Boards (SEB) were created and, by 1991, 
controlled more than 70% of generation and nearly all of distribution. This monopolization 
removed competition and therefore the impetus for deterioration in service and 
infrastructure.  
The reforms of the early 1990s were far more comprehensive than those in the 
1960s and again in the 1980s, but due to the global economic downturn in 1991, efforts 
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were thwarted by a perception that they were directed by the IMF and World Bank.75 This 
perception was incorrect and largely based in the fear that such reforms would be reversed 
after the economy improved, though the economic boom that followed in 1994–1997 
established a credibility that had been absent, as Indian GDP grew at an average rate of 
5.4% per year as  shown in Table 3.76 Following the 1991 financial crisis, the economic 
framework was profoundly reformed, including trade liberalization, industrial and 
electrical deregulation, opening to foreign direct investment (FDI), and other financial 
modifications.77 Delhi realized that electricity enables the establishment of significant 
public goods such as schools and medical clinics. Improved services lead to a more 
productive workforce thus contributing to economic growth. The subsequent growth rate 
coupled with relative increases in development encouraged Delhi to invest more heavily in 
the Indian population, particularly with respect to electrification. While government 
leaders increasingly saw a correlation between access to public goods and increased 
development and economic growth, public goods could not exist without access to reliable 
electricity. Socio-economic divisions within the country are centuries-old but significant 
progress has been made to reduce the inequality in terms of electrification and other public 
goods.  
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Table 3. Per Capita Income vs. Growth Rate.78 
State Per Capita Income, 
2006–7 
Population Avg. Growth Rate 1990–
2008 
Haryana 37.3 25.4 7.5 
Maharashtra 31 112.4 6.7 
Kerala 30 33.4 6.7 
Punjab 30 27.7 4.5 
Tamil Nadu 28.3 72.1 6.6 
Himachal Pradesh 28.6 6.9 6.9 
Gujarat 27 60.4 8.8 
Karnataka 23 61.1 7.4 
Andhra Pradesh 22.8 84.7 6.4 
West Bengal 21.8 91.3 7.2 
Rajasthan 16.5 68.6 5.8 
Orissa 15.5 41.9 5.1 
Assam 15.2 31.2 3.5 
Madhya Pradesh 12.9 72.6 4.8 
Uttar Pradesh 11.3 199.6 4.3 
Bihar 8.2 5.7 103.8 
 
B. POST-INDEPENDENCE DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS  
In the elections following independence, the peasant class predictably engaged in 
anti-landlord voting and vice-versa. In this section of class warfare, the poor sought to 
extract benefits and reform from the wealthy over demanding public goods and 
infrastructure from the state. Public goods further languished as rural elites were largely 
concerned with rent-collection instead of pressuring state agencies to provide infrastructure 
and resources that the farmers needed.79 
Non-landlord areas, by contrast, received significant state funding because the 
colonial government was able to set rates. State investment in infrastructure enabled the 
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state to increase its revenues. Uttar Pradesh had a mix of landlord (25%) and non-landlord 
(75%) districts and yet continues to show divergence even after independence.80 The 
extractive policies of the landlords were not adopted by the state, although it is far from 
clear that state elites do not abuse their position for private gain.81 Indeed, the policies of 
garibi hatao, “abolish poverty,” were intended to generate political capital but policies that 
benefitted lower classes were rarely pursued.82 As a result, Congress lost seats in favor of 
lower-caste parties such as the BSP and SP in 1989.  
In the current political climate, politicians affect access to basic public goods by 
undue influence on bureaucrats who enjoy employment at the politicians’ sufferance.83 
Electrical power distribution is essentially a balanced equation. The amount of power 
generated must be close to the amount consumed; if either too much or too little power is 
taken at any one node in a grid system (or if too much/too little power is generated) the 
grid will likely collapse with the outage spreading beyond state borders. This load 
imbalance was the cause of the outage affecting a large part of northeastern India in 2012. 
Politicians place great pressure on the operators to meet promises rather than ensure a 
stable grid.84 This pressure extends to job security; investigations have found that 
politicians pack the utilities with favored clients and are not hesitant to replace or transfer 
those who displease their patrons.85 
This has changed the fundamental calculus of public goods: rather than producing 
goods that stimulate health and development, private goods are instead produced for those 
with political connections. This assertion is supported by Abhijit Banerjee who conducted 
a study to determine how public goods were distributed. Banerjee’s conclusion was “…that 
access to public goods is substantially a matter of who can extract them from the political 
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system.”86 Banerjee expands on this, positing that that a lack of public goods becomes a 
vicious cycle; elites flee underperforming villages in favor of developed cities. This flight 
results in a lack of leadership in villages as well as a stop in infrastructure funding; very 
little point funding a clinic or school if there are no physicians or teachers.87 Additionally, 
Anusha Nath concluded that the lack of voter accountability leads to a higher probability 
that politicians will allocate resources to projects favored by their wealthy constituents.88  
Institutionalized favors to the politically connected and other elites runs counter to 
the modern concept of the rule of law. Institutional health ensures that elites/preferred 
groups do not exploit the economy for personal gain or, more perniciously, to repress a 
relatively powerless subset of the population. Neopatrimonialism perhaps best describes 
the conditions, where a patron-client relationship exists between the population and the 
ruling class, producing private goods for those in power instead of public goods for trade, 
expansion, and growth.89 As Kohli points out, government actors are not typically 
motivated by any definition of “public good” and, indeed, center around personal interests 
or establishing patronage relationships to ensure continued political power.90   
Selling public goods for private enrichment—rent-seeking—occurs on two 
different scales: grand and petty. Petty corruption is essentially direct bribery from those 
without power to those that do. Grand corruption, the type most commonly seen in 
electrification schemes, arises from bureaucracies attempting to privatize utilities in one 
form or another or by attempting to use one resource to bolster private economies, as later 
discussed in the explosion of biofuel and bagasse in Maharashtra. This is not to say, 
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however, that rents from contracting are the only reason bureaucrats may wish to ally with 
private enterprise.  
Rufin, et al. provide three reasons for involving government with electrification: 
limitations of private investors or companies, rent limitations or appropriations, and natural 
monopolies.91 Electrification in general—and rural in particular—relies on skills and 
specializations not readily available in government but easily found in private industry.92 
Corruption and rent-seeking, however, require not only institutions that are amenable to 
such exploitation, but also bureaucrats skilled in manipulation of people and resources. 
Petty corruption is rampant where Diamond’s strong men offer to sell illegal power 
connections or bribe officials to allow such connections.93 In some cases, such corruption 
extends into organized crime, which prevents engineers and auditors from enforcing 
regulations.94 Meanwhile, Hansen and Bower state that electrical engineers benefit from 
subsidy fraud; by over-reporting consumption by subsidized classes, such as agriculture, 
engineers are able to keep the difference.95 
Jennifer Bussell posits that a circular power structure exists due to the extent of 
petty corruption and bribery.96 Citizens require services from both politicians, for whom 
they vote, and bureaucrats to whom they pay bribes for expeditious and timely service. 
Bureaucrats, for their part, collect bribes as a matter of course to help prioritize. However, 
they also suffer from rent-seeking politicians, who are in turn forced to not only finance 
their own campaigns but deliver on the services promised to their constituents. Bussell uses 
this model as an informal institution to illustrate the demands—and therefore constraints—
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placed on citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians and the relative self-interest inherent in this 
structure, depicted in Figure 3.97  
 
Figure 2. Circular Power Structure within Indian Bureaucracy 
The state of Maharashtra is an example of politicized electrification attempts. The 
commitment to agricultural growth was the prime mover for electrification with the result 
that communities that were electrified gained considerable political power. This 
relationship begat a system of cross-subsidies between electricity, fertilizers, and prices; 
promoting electrical generation through bagasse (biofuel, specifically, sugar cane pulp) 
came to be seen as a way of not only preserving the subsidy system but also a boost to the 
agriculture industry.98 Electrical generation became politicized because it increased 
revenue streams to politically connected institutions. Despite the graft and rent-seeking, 
expansion of electricity became a prime goal in Indian politics.  
C. THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMS IN INDIA 
The Government of India, or GoI, concluded that electrification is a symbol of 
progress if not a social obligation, despite the fact that electrification of the hinterlands is 
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financially non-viable.99 The GoI learned, however, from the example of other countries 
in that while grid electrification is prohibitively expensive, other options are available. 
Indeed, the efforts of the Indian government since 1997 has produced several schemes in 
which the national government attempted to provide electrical power to the hinterlands. 
Rather than provide reliable power to everyone through a centralized grid, electrical power 
can be provided to rural communities through a scheme of decentralized sources or, in 
extreme cases, individual households can be powered through modular electrical systems. 
Indian planners came to realize that the neopatrimonial system is incompatible with 
effective electrification. Several policy initiatives have attempted to further extend the grid 
but these approaches ignore the fact that a centralized grid is too expensive given the 
country’s topography.100 As evidenced in the South African experience, distributed 
networks provide the best compromise of efficiency, affordability, and honesty. Theft of 
electricity, whether by meter manipulation or by criminal theft is a serious consideration 
when deciding how to proceed with respect to expansion of the electrical grid. 
Indian power bureaucracy starts at the state electricity boards (SEB), which own 
the interstate power lines and are responsible for power generation, transmission, and 
distribution. Overall planning and policy are set by the Ministry of Power (MoP) and the 
Central Electricity Authority (CEA). Initially, agricultural interest groups cultivated their 
political influence, yielding lucrative subsidies. These subsidies also tended to enrich urban 
elites, a key demographic that politicians require to remain in office. Subsidies for rural 
electrification are frequently met with skepticism in the literature, with many scholars 
noting that such schemes start with an attempt to alleviate poverty but ultimately become 
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self-enrichment schemes for elites.101 Rehman et al. note that subsidy reform is quite 
difficult due to the fact that attempts require the support of the same elites that the subsidies 
benefit. The IEA indicates this is a valid supposition, since, on a global scale, only 8% of 
the total spent on energy subsidies was spent on the lowest 20% of the population.102  
Subsidies are generally split between low-income families and agricultural 
concerns. World Bank studies show that while low-income households pay up to half the 
cost of their electricity, farmers receive the lion’s share of subsides, paying a mere 10%.103 
Fuel is likewise subsidized for those reliant upon household or village generators, but Rao 
writes that subsidized kerosene is resold on the black market.104 These subsidies tend to 
negatively impact not only the intended beneficiaries but the economy as a whole. Fuel is 
diverted either as adulterants (e.g., motor fuel), while electricity subsides use connections 
as a metric instead of actual power provided. The result is that the power generators are 
forced to absorb the cost when the global oil market shifts.  
Many argue that the Green Revolution was the prime mover for electrification, but 
the definitions proved problematic. Perhaps in an attempt to boost progress metrics, a 
village was considered to be electrified, for example, if a transformer was placed in it.105 
Naturally, the mere physical presence of infrastructure is only half of the picture; actual 
electricity must flow. While the Electricity Act allowed private ventures, the Ministry of 
Power (MoP), through the Rural Electrification Corporation Limited (REC) retained 
authority, oversight, and, when needed, financial assistance for each program.106 GoI has 
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struggled with numerous electrification schemes since independence, most notably the 
Kutir Jyothi Program (KJP), the Minimum Needs Program (MNP), the Rural Electricity 
Supply Technology (REST), and the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana 
(RGGVY).107 Table 3 provides a chronological list of the electrification schemes. 




Kutir Jyothi Program (KYP) 
 
1988 Subsidies, theft, default 
Rural Electricity Supply 
Technology (REST) Mission 
 




2003 Regulatory constraints 
Rajiv Gandhi Grameen 
Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) 
 
2005 Subsidies, loans, misleading 
metrics 
Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram 
Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) 
 
2015 Funding, misleading metrics 
 
1. Kutir Jyothi Program (KYP) 
The Kutir Jyothi Program (KJP), or “Bright Home Program,” in 1988 established 
a goal of providing single-point light connections to all households in the country who 
lived below the poverty line with the program financing the entire enterprise, including 
last-mile costs such as internal wiring.108 The Minimum Needs Program, designed to 
supplement the KJP, concentrated efforts in areas that that suffered electrification rates of 
less than 65% by providing last-mile costs such as internal wiring.109 The performance of 
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the MNP, like the KJP, was lackluster and ultimately discontinued. Programs that followed 
met similar fates.  
The KJP suffered from four fatal flaws: electricity leakage, subsidies, defaults, and 
loans.110 Utilities frequently received government loans for rural electrification and were 
therefore shouldered with the burden of repayment and interest. Repayments were further 
hampered by the fact that customers frequently found themselves in arrears, both because 
the customers simply couldn’t afford to pay their bill and poor bookkeeping practices by 
the utilities. Customers failed to pay their bills even though the government heavily 
subsidized their rates. For example, regulatory commission of the state of Karnataka set a 
19% tariff on the cost of supply, forcing the utilities to take a lower payment from the 
government than what was actually charged.111 These subsidies, like the one in Karnataka, 
fell below the cost of electrical generation leading several power companies to operate at 
a loss. The final burden, theft, figured most prominently as a “Swiss-cheese” model.112 As 
electrification expanded, new customers were added to a grid approaching its saturation 
point. Low-voltage power lines were added, rather than high-voltage, due to cost; such 
improper wiring led to unavoidable transmission losses. Connections were also often added 
without providing a meter as bureaucrats vice engineers determined what a household was 
likely to consume and tied that to an established subsidized price-point. The lack of 
metering as well as improper wiring increased potential for corruption at the customer 
level; theft via additional connections, overuse, or tank circuitry increased greatly but only 
through empirical evidence as the utilities were unable to discern between line losses and 
theft.113 
The confluence of subsidies and tariffs—funded by the federal government and 
administered by state governments and utilities—along with the patchwork of 
                                                 
110 Kulkarni and Anil, “Rural Electrification,” 387. 
111 Ibid. 
112 In modern aviation, crashes and other incidents are almost always the result of several missed 
opportunities for crew and controllers to avoid the mishap. This risk analysis model has been extended into 
other industries and is referred to as the “Swiss cheese model.” See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Swiss_cheese_model. 
113 Bhattacharyya, “Energy Access Problem,” 3392. 
37 
supplemental programs, ultimately created an environment in which consumers were 
caught between the competing interests of utilities attempting to remain solvent and 
politicians who exerted undue influence on management decisions. In the late 1990s, senior 
leadership in Delhi began to establish rural electrification as a priority, responding to voter 
complaints. The KYP and associated programs were scrapped and replaced by the 
Electricity Act of 2003. 
2. Rural Electricity Supply Technology Mission and the Electricity Act 
In the 1990s, India was confronted with the need for additional power capacity 
estimated in thousands of additional megawatts. However, India’s state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) were notoriously inefficient and beholden to political factions. Further, they 
operated with high deficits despite pressure to reduce costs. A sea change in development 
strategy occurred as elites began to believe that the greatest roadblock to increased 
development was the lack of financial capital. This was a shift from a central-planning 
scheme to market allocation, a key condition to boost investor confidence and an increase 
in FDI.114 The World Bank provided the impetus in its new policy of promoting private 
investment and development in the energy sector, leading GoI to follow suit with the 
intention of separating electricity from election campaigns and other political 
considerations.115 Indian states pursued this strategy with mixed results; some states, such 
as Orissa, ultimately failed in their privatization efforts while Delhi was relatively 
successful in privatizing distribution between Reliance Energy and Tata Power 
Company.116 Depoliticization resulted in the creation of state electricity regulatory 
commissions (SERC) but one of the leading complaints against them is that the regulators 
are chosen from a pool of existing bureaucrats with close ties to politicians, leading to 
questions about the true independence of the SERC. 
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The objective of the Rural Electricity Supply Technology (REST) Mission was to 
achieve total village electrification via decentralized renewable sources instead of relying 
solely on grid extension.117 The novel use of non-grid technology promised to be cheaper 
than attempting to scale the grid model into difficult, if not impassible, terrain. At the time, 
however, such units had prohibitively expensive up-front costs despite the relatively low 
long-term maintenance and fuel costs due in large part to the required number of 
households to establish a minimum load.118 Such small-scale units continued to be used, 
although in a peripheral role in village electrification.  
India’s pervasive bureaucracy renders the country unable to effectively implement 
stated policy goals and intentions. While the bureaucracy has created a sense of order and 
continuity, it is also prone to caste politics and rigid rules, hampering any attempts to 
change the status quo. According to Prime Minister Vajpayee, speaking in 2001, “the rigid 
mindset of the bureaucracy is obstructing the reform process.”119 Slow decision-making 
combined with punishment for mistakes without commensurate acknowledgment for 
success leads to bureaucratic careerism in which personal interests trump attempts at 
progress. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA), for example, has not been replaced or 
reformed despite requiring over a dozen clearances at the federal and state levels to approve 
an electricity project.120 Efforts are further hampered by a lack of coordination due to 
constitutional separation and a lack of consistency by politicians who are either for or 
against reform depending on whether they are running for office or are already in office. 
Since this lack of consistency breeds a lack of legitimacy, reform policies lack the 
imprimatur necessary for implementation. In short, weak institutions and government has 
led to bureaucratic mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption. 
                                                 
117 Debajit Palit and Akanksha Chaurey, “Off-Grid Rural Electrification Experiences from South 
Asia: Status and Best Practices,” Energy for Sustainable Development, 15, no. 3 (September 2011), 268, 
doi: 10.1016/j.esd.2011.07.004. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Rufin, et al., “The Changing Role of the State,” 662. 
120 Lawrence Saez, “A Comparison of India and China’s Foreign Investment Strategy Toward Energy 
Infrastructure,” Journal of Developing Areas 32, no. 2 (Winter 1998), 202. 
39 
GoI later enacted the Electricity Act of 2003 (EA2003), which greatly expanded 
grid sources while at the same time boosting renewable energy (RE) based off-grid systems 
through a series of local incentives.121 The act was a paradigm shift away from central 
regulation and permitted private investment and power generation and transmission. Along 
with the private development, it decentralized rural electrification efforts down to local 
governments and private organizations along with eliminating much of the requirements 
for licensure. Financial responsibility provisions were also included, requiring anti-theft 
measures such as electrical metering and encouraging private investment in the form of 
independent power producers (IPP) to sell power to public utilities at market rates, 
ultimately making up roughly a quarter of India’s total generating capacity.122 These IPPs 
were driven by a desire by Delhi to remove politics from energy pricing; Rao and others 
attribute the decline of the power sector to not only poor administration but also a concern 
that populism distorted market prices.123 
Consumer complaint offices were opened in an effort to protect customers. The 
creation of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (ATE) removed the need for lengthy and 
expensive trials, the only real recourse for complaints against the SEBs. The OECD 
provides for three pillars of governance: observance of shareholder rights; fiscal and 
operational transparency; and effective oversight.124 Since the SEBs were beholden to 
their legislative patrons, however, there was little if any true accountability. Shareholder 
rights were routinely ignored as SEBs failed to provide any reasonable rate of return on 
investments, resulting in a negative net worth as well as decimating consumer confidence. 
However, poor governance and mismanagement continues to fester as illustrated by 
subsidies default to utilities, paperwork delays, and efforts to bypass the ERCs.125  
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The EA2003 attempted to break the SEB monopolies but the process is delayed by 
routine granting of deadline extensions; central authorities were simply unwilling to accept 
the political and pecuniary risk incurred by the overall inability to address theft, vandalism, 
defaults, and supply shortages. The patronage relationship between government bureaus 
and utilities exacerbated the situation, leading to a perception amongst customers that there 
is a revolving door between government, SEBs, and utility leadership that leads to a sense 
of immunity—if not hostility—to regulatory reform even in the face of abysmal 
performance.126  
Unfortunately, existing regulations hamstrung off-grid efforts, preventing 
companies from adapting as they needed. This was corrected by the passage of the National 
Electrical Policy in 2005 and the Rural Electrification Policy a year later.127 The 2006 
Tariff Policy highlighted the concerns regarding risk aversion, noting that while 
improvements in board governance ought to result in loss reduction, the political will to do 
so was non-existent. Delhi acknowledged at this point that rural electrification would not 
happen in any meaningful sense unless the entire enterprise was stripped of political 
chicanery.128 However, the architecture of EA2003 created institutional conflict between 
the interests and authority of the state politicians, those at the national level, and the 
utilities. The SERCs suffered frequent interference from administrative bureaucrats and 
other government officials. Amendments to the EA2003 contributed to attempts to 
eliminate such meddling by reforming REST Mission programs and incorporating them 
into the new Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) scheme. 
3. Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) 
The RGGVY is intended, like many other grand schemes, to achieve 100% village 
electrification by 2012, since extended to 2017.129 The program codifies GoI’s 
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commitment to supply 24-hour electricity to increase economic activity and health care. 
However, unlike previous schemes, this plan does not rely on grid expansion, decreasing 
opportunities for graft. Instead, as in the South African model, local generation eliminates 
the exorbitant “last mile” installation costs inherent in grid distribution. The RGGVY is an 
ambitious undertaking, with the central government shouldering 90% of the cost with the 
remainder supplied in the forms of loans.130 The progress achieved by the RGGVY is 
substantial; over 72,000 villages were electrified between 2005 and 2010.131 The stricter 
definition of “electrified” as well as the economically favorable terms provided by the 
RGGVY are commonly cited as the reasons for the increase in electrification. Previously, 
villages were “electrified” if any electricity was consumed for any reason. Under RGGVY, 
electrification must meet three criteria: at least 10% of households must be powered; 
infrastructure, e.g., transformers, must be established, protected, and upgraded as 
necessary; and public institutions, e.g., medical facilities, must be electrified.132 Providing 
power to medical facilities is of critical importance, as many medicines and advanced 
diagnostic tools require electricity. Surveys have also shown that rural households tend to 
avoid clinics because of the lack of services when no power is available.133Electrical 
Subsidies 
Recouping the costs of electrification in India becomes problematic, as 85% of the 
total cost is covered by collected tariffs. Subsidies cover roughly half of the bill for rural 
populations while paying for more than 90% for farmers.134  The U.N. Environment 
Programme (UNEP) conducted a study in 2008 showing that farmers received subsidies 
totaling approximately USD6B per year, twice that of the spending allocated for rural 
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development.135 Misuse of subsidized goods is likewise an issue, with subsidized 
kerosene, intended for lighting and cooking, is resold on the black market or repurposed, 
such as a vehicle fuel additive.136 Elites advocated for the subsidies in the name of social 
justice but the true beneficiaries are the elites; subsidies are applied to the price of 
electricity by virtue of the consumers’ identity and location vice income level. This has 
dire consequences for the public sector oil companies, as GoI’s schemes are flat-rate and 
do not adjust to meet global market prices. From 2004–2011, for example, global oil prices 
surged without commensurate change in the subsidy rate, leading to a total revenue loss of 
nearly USD 10 billion in 2010.137 The losses are relevant because it represents the cost of 
lost opportunities in oil exploration, improved technology for generation and transmission, 
and construction of new infrastructure.  
Despite marketing campaigns promoting the virtues of subsidies, they are clearly 
not without risk. There are generally four consequences for poor subsidy management: 
subsidies can be diverted onto the black market, as seen in India’s experience with 
kerosene.138 Second, they can be misused or at least not used for their intended purpose, 
e.g., kerosene earmarked for cooking is instead used for lighting. Third, subsidies are 
meaningless if the actual product is unavailable. Under RGGVY, poor homes that live 
below the poverty line (BPL) receive free electricity, but blackouts are a fact of daily life. 
Finally, subsidies tend to be poorly targeted. Flat-rate schemes on fossil fuels in a net-
importing country frequently leads to oil companies perpetually operating at a loss.  
Subsidies for rural electrification are not inherently objectionable, particularly if 
their goals are accomplished. Electrifying remote hamlets may be a political goal and a 
social imperative but assumes that the inhabitants will base their consumption decisions 
based on the price of electricity. This is only part of the calculus, as consumers will also 
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base their energy decisions on the reliability of the electrical supply. If the supply is 
unreliable, then consumers will rely on their traditional sources regardless of the amount 
of subsidies they receive. Further, rate subsidies are unlikely to greatly impact poor families 
without commensurate subsidies for electrical appliances. RGGVY went a long way 
toward electrifying the hinterlands but the subsidies and unmetered connections to 
politically powerful agricultural interests are not sustainable because they incur severe 
costs to the power companies. Operating on the verge of insolvency, utilities have no 
incentive to shoulder additional risk by extending services, particularly to those who do 
not share political connections. As a result of the poor reviews, RGGVY was reformed into 
the Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) program. 
4. Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) 
Unsatisfied with the progress of the RGGVY and frustrated with political chicanery 
in power distribution, Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi enacted the Deendayal 
Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana, or DDUGJY, “Scheme of GoI for Rural Areas.”139 As 
Figure 3 shows, the progress in Uttar Pradesh is substantial. Out of 97,813 villages in the 
state, only 224 remain unserviced, with all but 71 in progress; 21 of those have been 
awarded contracts to be electrified by the end of 2017 and the remaining 50 villages are 
uninhabited.140 On the national scale, out of 597,464 villages, as determined by the 2005 
Census, 590,967 have been electrified accounting for 98.9% of the total.141 The DDUGJY 
has allocated approximately 9.5B Rupees (Rs) for the remaining projects in Uttar Pradesh 
alone out of Rs 756 billion earmarked for the total scheme.142 
The money is split between electrification methods for the remaining villages; 8060 
have been identified for grid expansion with 3433 to be electrified through off-grid 
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means.143 Politicians were presented with a number of courses of action, from expanding 
the grid via transmission lines and additional power plants to small microgenerators for 
remote village use. Preferring large projects, federal and state governments quickly become 
embroiled in boondoggles with frequent political turnover. This resulted in not only private 
investment withdrawal, but also established India as an unreliable investment partner. The 
local communities, on the other hand, enjoy a much better relationship as personal contacts 
and insider information are key. Foreign companies have found it far easier to conduct 
business in India through partnerships with local organizations but it still does not 
overcome the bureaucratic inertia nor the perception that it is difficult to do business in the 
country. After years of reforms and schemes, the electricity sector is largely unchanged; 
private investment is discouraged in favor of monopolistic state-owned enterprises. 
Some GoI politicians have made strides in increasing transparency regarding efforts 
to electrify remote villages. Minister of State Piyush Goyal has been quite vocal in his 
advocacy, even going so far as to publish a mobile app for Android, Apple, and Windows 
devices that displays the number of electrified villages ahead of deadlines set by the 
DDUGJY.144 On the rollout for the app, Minister Goyal tweeted, “Track in real time as 
we electrify every single one of our villages. Hold us accountable!”145 The dashboard of 
the app, as shown in Figure 3, shows the total number of unelectrified villages and the 
status of those in progress. The Milestones tab, shown in Figure 4, shows the percentage 
accomplished measured against the days left in the program, expiring on March 31, 2017. 
                                                 
143 MoP, “DDUGJY Guidelines,” accessed 30 July 2016, www.ddugjy.gov.in/mis/portal/
meeting_events_pdf.jsp?NEWS_NO=10061. 
144 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.phonegap.kyrovidyut. 




Figure 3. GARV Dashboard, December 13, 2016146 
                                                 
146 GARV App screen capture via author’s Android device. 
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Figure 4. GARV Dashboard, December 13, 2016 (left) and April 24, 
2017 (right).147 
One of the leading criticisms of the DDUGJY program is, as in earlier programs, is 
the use of inappropriate metrics, e.g., the number of electrified villages vice households. 
This lack of “last-mile” support is the source of much frustration towards Delhi and state 
governments, but a great deal of frustration is also expressed toward the petty corruption 
experienced at the local level, where bribery runs rampant. While electrification at the 
customer level is challenging, overcoming established bureaucratic interests is even more 
so. Expanding grid supply to those regions that can support it presents even more political 
pressure to load centers. As discussed earlier, engineers are put under great pressure to 
                                                 
147 GARV App screen captures via author’s Android device. 
47 
deliver promises made by politicians regardless of the risk of blackouts. While the political 
culture is changing with the promotion of electrification, it remains to be seen how readily 
entrenched interests will follow Delhi’s lead.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the ways in which pre- and post-independence political 
economies and rent-seeking have affected the Indian government’s electrification schemes 
and approaches to electricity subsidies. GoI’s colonial and socialist experience has 
influenced the institutions that govern infrastructure development; early aversion to private 
enterprise has led to a social, political, and economic structure that is, at its most basic 
level, protective of bureaucratic and political careers. This careerism has developed into a 
patronage system that delivers public goods as a reward for those with political 
connections. Expansion of rural electrification is certainly impeded by engineering 
concerns and geography, but the impact of a small number of politically connected 
bureaucrats places huge pressure on service providers to deliver to favored constituencies 
vice the larger public.  
Delhi has accepted the conventional wisdom that electrification has the potential to 
reduce poverty in both the short and long-term analyses. Despite the benefits that come 
with it, the household electrification rates still pale when compared with those of overall 
village electrification.148 India’s rural electrification experience follows the same triad of 
politics, technology, and finance that drove South Africa’s programs. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, South African electrification schemes relied on subsidies and a 
distributed network of non-grid systems. Unfortunately, due to widespread theft and 
vandalism, the programs would not be sustainable without the continued subsidies. This is 
not to say the programs are without merit; as previously pointed out, healthcare outcomes 
and economic growth increase with electrification. 
The expansion of the regulatory space is one of the means by which elites capture 
public goods for allocation to their clients. Until the opening of private providers in 2003, 
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the SEBs were the only source of electrical power and under the sway of elected officials 
and their client bureaucrats. Anecdotal evidence suggests that personnel changes were 
rampant depending on election results, thus ensuring uninterrupted service to the 
politician’s favored constituencies.149 
Privatization of providers has increased in the years since 2003 in part due to the 
rampant corruption but also due to the mismatched pricing structures that have led to 
insolvency of the SEBs. If SEBs cannot provide reliable power to their customers, then 
private individuals and organizations will fill the gap, creating so-called captive power 
plants. The Electricity Act’s open access clause forced SEBs to permit private power 
transmission, creating a market whereby providers and distributors must compete for 
customers. This new operating space has the potential to reduce the effect of patronage 
relationships but the effects remain small due to the outsized production of the existing 
state and central utilities. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. BARRIERS TO ELECTRIFICATION 
Electrical demand, services, and implementation serves as an indicator of 
development, growth, and an increase in quality-of-life and is a key variable when 
considering India, roughly three-quarters of whose population live outside urban centers 
and a country home to a quarter of the world’s poor. Conventional wisdom—as noted in 
multiple sources—holds that electrification has a direct impact to healthcare outcomes and 
a primary component of improved education. Access to electrical power that is affordable, 
reliable, and nonpolitical—particularly to the poor—has been acknowledged as a high 
government priority in terms of development and social progress, but efforts to electrify 
the hinterlands has been plagued by both technical and institutional barriers.  
As discussed in chapter two, technical barriers, such as load factor and power 
distribution, are engineering problems. Such issues are exacerbated by the pursuit of 
solutions favored by politicians and elites that may not be the best remedy. The ongoing 
debate of grid vs non-grid—including microgenerator—systems revolve around 
technology, terrain, and organizational risk. Technological advances in both traditional and 
renewable generators are attractive but are unproven, particularly in impassible terrain and 
unpredictable conditions. India’s experience with FDI and other private firms is lackluster 
and has created a culture of risk aversion; companies have failed to deliver on high-profile 
projects, leading to difficulty in financing new projects. While fulfillment of social 
obligations is a noble and worthwhile endeavor, fiscal viability is a non-trivial concern. 
Bureaucracies are often focused on benchmarks and metrics for a number of reasons, many 
of them valid. However, such metrics should be redefined from simple installation and 
moved toward evaluating the economic and health outcomes in specific areas or villages. 
Focusing on outcomes would force the consideration of decentralized factors such as 
electrical consumption and the availability therein, including a stable and reliable supply 
Customer behavior also impacts the available solutions. If customers do not, or 
cannot, acquire consumer appliances or engage in commerce, the demand, i.e., load, may 
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be insufficient to continue operations. Underloading generators has deleterious effects and 
can force the operator to shut down operations. Naturally, the reliability problem creates a 
cycle; power availability is reduced because not enough people have electrical devices, but 
they are unwilling to purchase them because the power is not reliable. This can be partially 
addressed by information and marketing campaigns order to combat this, encouraging 
customers to invest in electrical appliances perhaps by highlighting the social benefits that 
come with stable electricity (e.g., advanced medical care).  
Engagement at the local level as well is an essential part of administering an 
electrical system. Bill collection and maintenance are best performed at a local level to 
minimize default, theft, and vandalism. Providing a sense of ownership to the locality 
ensures that abuse and theft is minimized, while reliable bill collection ensures continuous 
viability of the electrical project. Training local residents to operate and maintain their 
systems has been proven to reduce reliance on external experts. Local experts are best 
suited for developing their own short- and long-term planning needs, including fuel supply 
and maintenance requirements. 
The regulatory space in which electrical infrastructure operates has traditionally 
used a combination of subsidies and taxes along with regulations in order to further 
electrification goals as seen in chapter three. The results have been nearly opposite, though, 
as heavy subsides effectively price-out non-state actors, who are left to struggle for largely 
unavailable financing. GoI’s centralized strategy for implementation and expansion 
discourage contributions from NGOs and the private sector. Commercial credit is nearly 
nonexistent or requires untenable conditions for repayment due to a lack of project 
successes that would build investor confidence. Policies such as the Electricity Act of 2003 
have done little to ameliorate the regulatory hurdles to generation and distribution. Current 
legislation allows for rent-seeking behavior and bureaucratic delays, further discouraging 
private innovation and involvement.  
India’s energy policies and practices have steadily shifted from the socialism 
favored in the Nehru and Gandhi years. The development of alternative political parties 
and the organization of agricultural elites eventually directed the sector away from state-
ownership toward private generation. Despite the progress made by the electrification 
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schemes since 2003, Delhi’s approach remains centralized, curiously at odds with the 
distributed non-grid solutions presented for rural villages. This centralization tends to 
discourage local organizations and NGOs due to the institutional barriers to entry. Without 
the central planners’ imprimatur, commercial credit and funding is nearly non-existent, but 
the market for market for renewable solutions is flourishing.  
B. KEY FINDINGS 
India’s political legacy of integrating socialism, nationalism, and democracy has 
resulted in an unstable foundation for improving the electricity sector. Foreign direct 
investment was implemented in 1991 as a result of a monetary crisis rather than any 
legitimate political initiative. Additionally, GoI favored grand, large-scale schemes rather 
than engage in smaller, more controlled projects, thus reducing the opportunity for lessons 
learned. GoI also created transparency problems by fast-tracking projects while refusing 
compromise on end-states regardless of how realistic the expectations were. These 
conditions led to frequent course changes with respect to Indian policy while maximizing 
profits for foreign investors as capital was received but no expenditures could be made. 
Geography is a determinant in terms of investment and, ultimately, public goods 
and services. India’s colonial experience showed that such investment was only made 
where it was likely to maximize returns on said investment and further trade expansion. 
Thus, people who chose to not live in urban centers were largely abandoned by modernity; 
there was no choice to have the best of both worlds. This has the potential of initiating a 
death spiral wherein rural elites depart for the urban cities, leaving the poorest in the areas 
with neither access to public goods nor the avenues the gain it. While seventy years have 
passed since independence, the impact of colonization is still felt as the attitudes of those 
in the zamindari and raiyatwari areas have been institutionally entrenched. Attempts at 
reform will need to address the root causes of these perceptions and a cultural shift in 
political relationships. 
Conventional means of meeting rural electrification goals will not be as efficient or 
successful if institutional barriers to entry are not lifted. Sector reforms to date have 
attempted to shift authority away from the vertical state-owned enterprises and promote 
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private enterprise and foreign investment. This is not simply a sector realignment or a 
promotion to attract capital; the socialism of Nehru and Gandhi viewed electricity as a 
statement of the benefactor-beneficiary relationship between government and the 
governed. Shifting to a private enterprise model refutes this relationship. Scholars have 
noted the inefficient and insolvent electricity sector and while the cited causal factors range 
from purely engineering or other technical problems to bureaucratic issues such as rent-
seeking. Regardless, the factors point toward a broader institutional failure to provide 
electricity, particularly to the most poverty-stricken citizens, but financial pressures cannot 
be discounted as a causal factor for sector reform as seen in the early 1990s and 2003. 
Distributed generation schemes such as SHS and small local generators are well-suited to 
providing power to populations that cannot realistically be served by the existing grid. Such 
schemes also have a high probability of bill payment; by ensuring payment and 
discouraging theft, local projects have a higher likelihood of securing financing. 
Affordability is key to encouraging households to choose electricity over more primitive 
and unhealthy energy production.  
Income, the other side of the affordability coin, also plays a significant role in a 
family’s decision regarding energy sources. Perhaps unsurprisingly, higher-income 
households generally choose “more efficient and more convenient sources of energy such 
as gas and electricity, while poor people use less efficient and less convenient sources such 
as fuelwood and human energy.”150 Delhi has pushed for rural electrification but they have 
struggled with numerous schemes. Even with access to basic service, many households 
cannot afford it and continue to burn solid matter; the only cost is the time it takes to collect 
the fuel. While this has non-trivial opportunity costs, it still largely explains why roughly 
69% of the population rely on wood and dung for fuel.151 Banerjee’s declaration—that 
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access to public goods is determined by the ability to extract them from the political 
system—still holds true.152  
Rural electrification has numerous benefits, not the least of which includes better 
health and economic development. However, India’s centralized control of power at the 
state level, combined with a history of customer default and market distortions caused by 
heavy regulation and subsidies, have hamstrung rural electrification efforts. 
Decentralization of non-urban power supply is key to ensuring efficient operation. Local 
partnerships are better suited to negotiate directly with vendors; small-scale engineering 
and financial challenges are better overcome without national bureaucratic interference and 
can be tailored to each community’s needs. While centralized control of a grid may be 
necessary—and perhaps even beneficial—in urban centers, local control of a non-grid 
system will likely yield better results in rural or inaccessible locales. Providing power 
across the states is an inclusive goal that will only benefit all members of Indian society. 
The political-technical dyad presented here represents the confluence of politics, 
patronage, and technology. Given the relationship between the three, it appears that 
electricity may not be the prime mover for economic growth but rather the catalyst for 
social and political change that growth requires. Technical and financial leaders should 
concentrate on developing reliable solutions that are priced appropriately and join forces 
with local leaders in order to build and set expectations for consumers. Likewise, regulators 
should be engaged to realign institutional capacity and develop regulations that foster a 
consumer-friendly environment instead of one that enriches elite patrons.  
As an aspect of human nature, technical innovations are more attractive than new 
political schemes and regulations. In other words, promoting the latest technology without 
concurrent modification to the regulatory space will have no appreciable benefits. 
Similarly, market dynamics in and of themselves will fail to achieve the desired outcomes. 
If Delhi truly desires to shift to a broader market environment, the regulatory space needs 
a vision and roadmap to outline the transition that minimizes institutional disruption, 
encourages market development, and delivers affordable and reliable power. The greater 
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effects in improving rural electrification lie in overcoming the barriers in government, 
bureaucratic, and social institutions. Institutions are not merely political entities, but rather 
avatars of political, social, and cultural norms. Attempts at energy reform need to address 
each of those in order to overcome bureaucratic inertia. Solutions to electrification must be 
at least as comprehensive as the environment in which they operate and a holistic vision is 
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